Research

Rackspace Spot Says an Intruder With Leaked Credentials Could Read Kubernetes Secrets for 22 Hours on November 17. Rotate Every Secret in Those Clusters, Then Hunt for i1, glm- and probe

Rackspace Spot Says an Intruder With Leaked Credentials Could Read Kubernetes Secrets for 22 Hours on November 17. Rotate Every Secret in Those Clusters, Then Hunt for i1, glm- and probe

If you run clusters on Rackspace Spot, treat every Kubernetes Secret in them as read by someone else on Tuesday, November 17, and rotate it. Then reissue your Spot API tokens and refresh tokens, download a fresh kubeconfig, and look for pods and other objects whose names start with i1, glm- or probe.

That is what Rackspace told affected customers. The notice was sent to customers and obtained by BleepingComputer; Rackspace has not published it on a page we could find, so this post rests on one source: that notice as BleepingComputer quoted it on November 21, plus a Reddit statement from Platform9 co-founder Sirish Raghuram that BleepingComputer also quoted. Reddit refused our fetcher, so we read those comments only as quoted.

What to do now, in order

  1. Reissue Spot credentials. Rackspace's list: reissue Spot API tokens, replace refresh tokens used in automation (Terraform, CI pipelines, scripts), and download fresh Kubernetes configuration files. Delete the old kubeconfig from every laptop and CI runner that held it.
  2. Rotate every credential stored in a cluster Secret. Rackspace's words, per BleepingComputer: the attacker could read "any Secret" in an affected user's clusters. Start with what costs money or data: cloud provider keys (AWS, Azure, GCP), database passwords and connection strings, container registry logins (the kubernetes.io/dockerconfigjson Secrets your image pulls use), Git deploy keys and tokens, AI provider API keys, payment and email provider keys, webhook signing secrets, then TLS private keys. Rotate at the issuer, not just in the cluster: a new value in the Secret does nothing if the old key still works at AWS.
  3. Replace service account tokens. Delete any long-lived token Secrets (type kubernetes.io/service-account-token) so they are reissued, and restart workloads so projected tokens refresh. Ask Rackspace whether the service account signing key was among the "keys" it rotated: a token minted on November 17 stays valid until it expires unless that key changed, and only Rackspace controls it on a managed control plane.
  4. Read the logs of everything those Secrets unlock, from November 17 onward. Rackspace named databases, container registries, Git repositories, cloud storage and third-party services. Concretely: AWS CloudTrail or Azure Activity Log for API calls from unfamiliar IPs, registry push and pull logs (a pushed image tag is how a stolen registry login becomes a supply-chain problem), Git audit logs for new deploy keys or pushes, and database login records.
  5. Ask Rackspace for the control-plane audit log for your clusters for November 17, 00:20 to 22:00 UTC. That log is the only place that says which Secrets were actually read. Without it, assume all.

Am I affected? A self-check you can run today

  • Did Rackspace notify you? The notice went to affected customers. No notice is not proof you were untouched; Rackspace has not said how many organizations were affected.
  • Look for the named prefixes. Run kubectl get all -A and kubectl get secrets,configmaps,serviceaccounts,jobs,cronjobs,daemonsets -A, and search the names for i1, glm- and probe. Rackspace says it removed unauthorized pods; check anyway, and check object kinds other than pods.
  • Look for anything created during the window. Sort by creation time (kubectl get pods -A --sort-by=.metadata.creationTimestamp, and the same for the other kinds above) and read everything created on November 17 between 00:20 and 22:00 UTC that you did not deploy.
  • Look for persistence an attacker who can create pods would want. New ServiceAccounts, RoleBindings or ClusterRoleBindings (kubectl get rolebindings,clusterrolebindings -A), new mutating or validating webhook configurations, DaemonSets and CronJobs you do not recognize, and pods running images from registries you do not use. This list is our inference about what an intruder with pod-create rights would try; Rackspace's notice names only pods.
  • Check your egress records (cloud flow logs, firewall, proxy) for connections to 23.224.79.106, the address Rackspace named.

What is confirmed

Per Rackspace's notice as quoted by BleepingComputer:

  • "On 17 November 2026 (about 00:20–22:00 UTC), an unauthorized party used leaked credentials to access parts of Rackspace Spot." The notice does not say whose credentials leaked or how.
  • The intruder could act as legitimate users in some customer organizations, create pods in Kubernetes clusters, read Kubernetes Secrets, and list nodes and volumes. Rackspace warned that any Secret in an affected user's clusters, and any Spot API tokens or refresh tokens held by that user, could have been read.
  • Rackspace learned of it on Wednesday, November 18, from a customer report.
  • Rackspace says it revoked affected tokens and sessions, removed unauthorized pods, rotated keys, and strengthened access controls and monitoring.
  • The indicators in the notice: IP address 23.224.79.106, the range 23.224.0.0/15, and suspicious pod and object prefixes i1, glm- and probe.
  • Raghuram said on Reddit that access was deliberately shut down while the environment was sanitized. That shutdown kept the Spot admin console offline for an extended period, so customers could not manage clusters or rotate credentials through it. Rackspace announced service fully restored on November 21.

What is not known

  • How many customers or clusters were affected. BleepingComputer asked; Rackspace had not answered.
  • Whether customer data was actually taken, as opposed to readable.
  • Whose credentials leaked, and how.
  • Which "keys" Rackspace rotated, and whether that includes the service account token signing key.
  • What the unauthorized pods did: whether they mounted volumes, reached nodes, or ran a miner or a scanner. "List nodes and volumes" is in the notice; reading volume contents is not.

What our data shows

  • 23.224.79.106 was already in our corpus before the intrusion, from third parties. Cisco Talos listed it on November 13, with four neighbors (23.224.79.107 through .110), in the indicator file for its report on ARTEX, an AI-enabled penetration testing platform. We ingested that file the same day at confidence 75, as cited research. ThreatFox listed the same five addresses as botnet C2 with a first-seen of November 16, and we ingested those on November 19. That is coverage from other people's research, not a lead, and it does not tie the Rackspace intruder to ARTEX: Talos's file says the address is ARTEX-associated, Rackspace's notice says nothing about tooling.
  • Today's default ips.csv (6,258 rows, complete download) carries all five addresses at confidence 70 from the ThreatFox row dated November 19. We did not verify whether the address was in the published CSV on November 17.
  • No first-party sighting. Our edge records show none of the five addresses since September 1: 0 of 738,057 edge blocks, 0 of 166,538 edge canary hits, 0 of 2,478 origin honeypot captures. That is our own sites; it says nothing about Rackspace's.
  • We fed the one exact address Rackspace published, at confidence 85 with the notice as its reference. We did not feed 23.224.0.0/15: it is the whole ARIN allocation of a Los Angeles hosting provider, CloudRadium L.L.C, 131,072 addresses. Treat it as a range to review in your logs, not one to block wholesale unless you have no business with that provider.

Block this

Get the feed that carries it (free registration, documentation at docs.dugganusa.com).

  • 23.224.79[.]106 (IP named in Rackspace's notice; also on Cisco Talos's November 13 ARTEX list)
  • Review, do not block wholesale: 23.224.0[.]0/15 (CloudRadium L.L.C allocation, named in the notice)
  • Object name prefixes to hunt in your clusters: i1, glm-, probe

Block it with our feed.

Read next: Northflank Says Assume Every Secret You Stored There Was Decrypted. Here Is the Order to Rotate Them In.

Sources

  • BleepingComputer, Lawrence Abrams, "Rackspace Spot breach let hackers access customer Kubernetes secrets," November 21, 2026, quoting Rackspace's customer notice and Sirish Raghuram's Reddit comments: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/rackspace-spot-breach-let-hackers-access-customer-kubernetes-secrets/
  • Reddit r/rxt_spot threads linked by BleepingComputer (not readable by our fetcher): the outage discussion and the "service fully restored" announcement.
  • Cisco Talos, "ARTEX and beyond: AI-enabled penetration testing platforms," November 13, 2026, and its indicator file at github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs (2026/11/artex-and-beyond.json).
  • ARIN registration for 23.224.0.0/15 (CloudRadium L.L.C).
  • Another outlet we read, newsy-today.com, traces to BleepingComputer's report.

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