Research

vCenter CVE-2026-123890 Was a Zero-Day Since September. Google Ties It to China-Nexus ARMORY CASTLE. Patch, Close TCP 2012, Then Hunt

vCenter CVE-2026-123890 Was a Zero-Day Since September. Google Ties It to China-Nexus ARMORY CASTLE. Patch, Close TCP 2012, Then Hunt

If you run VMware vCenter, the flaw Broadcom fixed yesterday has already been used against at least one real network. Do three things today. Patch vCenter to 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 or 8.0 U3m. Block inbound TCP 2012 on the vCenter appliance from everything that does not need it. Then hunt for the signs listed below, because patching does not remove an attacker who got in before the fix.

Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant published "ARMORY CASTLE Exploits vSphere" on Thursday, November 19, 2026, the same day as Broadcom's advisory VMSA-2026-0009. They write that the group they call ARMORY CASTLE, formerly tracked as UNC5221 and described as a suspected China-nexus espionage group, "exploited this vulnerability in early September 2026 using BONESAW, according to forensic evidence." That makes CVE-2026-123890 a zero-day for about ten weeks before the fix.

Our post yesterday said there were no reported attacks. That was true of every source we read when we wrote it: Broadcom's advisory said nothing about exploitation, and it still does not. We have updated that post with a dated note pointing here.

What is confirmed

These come from the Google/Mandiant post, which describes one investigated intrusion. It does not say how many organizations were hit.

  • The bug. In Google's words: "CVE-2026-123890 is an unauthenticated Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session key disclosure vulnerability over Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Calls (DCE/RPC). Successful exploitation results in a remote authentication bypass which creates an authenticated session established as [email protected]." The service is the VMware Directory Service's rpc_srp_verifier on TCP port 2012. No password is needed.
  • The tool. BONESAW, a Go program, exploits the bug, creates an SSO administrator account, copies the vCenter directory database (/storage/db/vmware-vmdir/data.mdb) and pulls the signing keys out of it. Google says it "achieves full system compromise against vCenter Server 7.x and 8.x appliances."
  • Two zero-days, not one. The way in was a separate zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support, CVE-2026-102764 (BeyondTrust advisory BT26-05). CISA added that one to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on October 16, 2026. From the Remote Support appliance the attackers moved to an internal Linux appliance with no endpoint detection, then to vCenter.
  • What they did after. A forged-SAML tool (SAWSNAKE) for Administrator sessions; a backdoored Dropbear SSH server (BEARBONES) on TCP 53 and TCP 33992; a new local administrator account named sps-[redacted]@vsphere.local; SSH switched on through the appliance management API, used, then switched off; then ESXi, where they logged in as root over SSH, added a key to root's authorized_keys, read guest virtual disks directly and pulled out Windows domain controller files (NTDS, SYSTEM, SECURITY). The data left as o.tar.gz. A Slack-controlled backdoor (LAZYBONES) sat on another Linux appliance.
  • Patching the July vCenter flaw did not help. Google's logs show BONESAW running in early September against a vCenter already patched for the July 29 vmdir flaw. The BONESAW binary carries a build timestamp of July 13, 2026. Google notes that build metadata can be edited, so treat that date as a hint, not proof.

What is not known

  • How many victims. The post describes one intrusion. Neither Google nor Broadcom gives a count.
  • Whether Broadcom will say it is exploited. Broadcom updated VMSA-2026-0009 on November 20 to version 0009.1, and the only change it lists is "clarify the impacted VMware Tools versions." The advisory still makes no statement about exploitation.
  • CISA's catalog. CVE-2026-123890 is not in the KEV catalog yet. The newest catalog we downloaded on November 20 is version 2026.11.18, released November 18 at 19:17 UTC, before either publication. Expect it to be added; do not wait for it.
  • Hashes and domains. Google's post lists no file hashes and no domains. It points readers to a Google Threat Intelligence collection for those, which we did not read.
  • Whether vCenter 9.x was targeted. Google names 7.x and 8.x as what BONESAW compromises. Broadcom's advisory lists 9.0 and 9.1 as affected too, so patch them anyway.
  • A public exploit. A GitHub repository claiming to be a proof of concept for this CVE appeared on November 20 at 11:25 UTC. We read it without running it. It cites a different advisory (VMSA-2026-0019), different fixed versions (8.0 U4b) and a different port (TCP 135 and 445, not 2012), and its mechanism does not match Google's. We do not consider it a working exploit. Do not run code like it inside your network.

What to do

  1. Patch. vCenter 9.1.x to 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.x to 9.0.2.0200, 8.0 to 8.0 U3m. Cloud Foundation 5.x follows Broadcom's asynchronous patch path to vCenter 8.0 U3m and SDDC Manager 5.2.5. vCenter 7.0 has no public fix: Broadcom says contact support under an extended contract. Broadcom presumes 6.5 and 6.7 are affected. Our post from yesterday has the upgrade trap around VCF 9.1.1.
  2. Close TCP 2012. This is the port the exploit uses. Google's post recommends an inbound DROP on TCP 2012 to vmdird, and DROP rules on 443, 5480 and 22 limited to trusted management hosts. Google also notes that the vCenter appliance's own firewall is managed through the appliance management interface on TCP 5480, which an attacker with access can use to turn it off, so enforce this upstream as well. Its table header says "TCP 2010"; the text and the exploit both say 2012.
  3. Check what can reach vCenter. In this case the attacker reached it from two other appliances inside the network: a remote-support box and a Linux appliance without endpoint detection. If you run BeyondTrust Remote Support, confirm you applied BT26-05.
  4. Restrict egress from vCenter and ESXi. Google's hardening guidance drops outbound traffic by default, which would have blocked both the SCP exfiltration and the Slack-based backdoor.
  5. If you find signs below, treat it as an incident, not a patch job. The attacker had the directory database, the signing keys and the master crypto key. Rotating only the administrator password does not undo a forged-SAML capability. Bring in incident response and plan to rotate the vCenter STS signing certificate and the credentials stored in vCenter.

Am I affected? What to hunt for

First, check your version. In the vSphere Client the vCenter Summary tab shows version and build; in PowerCLI, after Connect-VIServer, read $global:DefaultVIServer.Version and $global:DefaultVIServer.Build. Anything below the fixed versions above is exposed.

Then look for the activity Google describes. These come straight from its post:

  • Accounts: any user in vsphere.local whose name starts with sps-, and any SSO administrator account you did not create. Review SSO users and the Administrators group in the vSphere Client.
  • SSH turned on: a PUT to /rest/appliance/access/ssh in the appliance management API logs, especially one followed by SSH logins with a new local account and SSH being turned off again.
  • Files on vCenter or Linux appliances: /tmp/123, /tmp/123.rar, /tmp/123.key, /tmp/sss, /tmp/dbr, /tmp/rar, /tmp/gdb_file, /tmp/rsa_host_key, /tmp/ecdsa_host_key, /tmp/dss_host_key, and /usr/bin/vmtoolscs (not a real VMware Tools binary).
  • Web shells on internal Java appliances: ActiveSer.jsp and u.jsp.
  • Listeners: an SSH server on TCP 33992 or TCP 53 on an appliance, answering with the banner SSH-2.0-pulsesecure_23345.
  • ESXi: unexpected root SSH logins, new entries in root's authorized_keys, a hidden directory named .a on a VMFS volume, any file named o.tar.gz, and use of a tool called vmfs_browser.py.
  • Commands: echo of a base64 string piped to base64 -d, gdb attached with a command file, curl downloads into /tmp, and nmap scans for ports 2012, 5480 and 9080.
  • Other: a systemd service that restarts every 50 minutes, Slack API traffic from Linux servers, and outbound SSH from an appliance to ESXi hosts.

Google also names six YARA hunting rules (G_Hunting_Webshell_SLIMSAVAGE_1, G_Hunting_Webshell_CAGEMATCH_1, G_Hunting_Utility_SAWSNAKE_2, G_Hunting_Utility_BONESAW_2, G_Hunting_Backdoor_BEARBONES_1, G_Hunting_Backdoor_LAZYBONES_1) and points to Mandiant's open-source VCSA hardening and logging tool on GitHub (mandiant/vcsa-hardening-tool).

The network indicators

Block these: get the free feed key and pull our blocklist. Integration docs are at docs.dugganusa.com.

Google's post lists 11 IP addresses, each labeled "Suspected Obfuscation Network IP." These are relay nodes the group used to hide where it came from, not command servers. Nodes like these are often hijacked or rented devices and can change hands, so use them to search past logs first and block second. None of the 11 was in our corpus before today. We added all 11 to our feed under the source manual-batch-vcenter-cve-2026-123890-exploited-armory-castle at confidence 80, attributed to Google's research, not to anything we observed.

How we know

We read Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant's post "ARMORY CASTLE Exploits vSphere" (November 19, 2026, seven named authors), which is the only primary source for the exploitation, the attribution and every indicator above. The Hacker News reported it on November 20; that article adds nothing beyond the Google post, so this is one source, not two.

We read Broadcom's VMSA-2026-0009 advisory, now at revision 0009.1 dated November 20, and its Q&A on the VMware GitHub. Neither mentions exploitation. We downloaded CISA's KEV JSON on November 20 (catalog 2026.11.18): no entry for CVE-2026-123890; CVE-2026-102764 was added October 16.

We checked each of the 11 IP addresses against our corpus with our correlation lookup before adding them: none was held, and none had a neighbor in the same /24. We then ingested them and read each record back.

Our edge did not see this, and could not have. The exploit is DCE/RPC on TCP 2012 against an appliance that sits inside your network, which is not something a web edge observes. We also scanned our edge records since August 1 for the post-exploitation web paths Google names (/rest/appliance/access/ssh, the vCenter SAML login path, ActiveSer.jsp): 0 matches in 655,170 edge block records, 174,888 edge canary records and 5,774 origin honeypot records. That zero measures our own web properties, which run no vCenter. It says nothing about who is scanning for vCenter.

Sources

  • Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant, "ARMORY CASTLE Exploits vSphere," November 19, 2026: cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-vsphere
  • Broadcom, VMSA-2026-0009.1: support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/39495
  • Broadcom, VMSA-2026-0009 Questions and Answers: github.com/vmware/vcf-security-and-compliance-guidelines (security-advisories/vmsa-2026-0009)
  • BeyondTrust, BT26-05: beyondtrust.com/trust-center/security-advisories/bt26-05
  • Mandiant, vSphere and BRICKSTORM Malware: A Defender's Guide: cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/vsphere-brickstorm-defender-guide
  • Mandiant VCSA hardening and logging tool: github.com/mandiant/vcsa-hardening-tool
  • CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, version 2026.11.18
  • The Hacker News, "China-Linked Hackers Exploit Critical VMware vCenter Zero-Day to Gain Admin Access and Steal Data," November 20, 2026

Block these: get the free feed key and the 11 addresses above come with every other indicator we hold.

Read next: VMware vCenter Has a 9.8 Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-123890): versions, the upgrade trap and the other four bugs in VMSA-2026-0009


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