Trigram: Fake Job, Conference and Parcel Sites for About 50 AI and Crypto Brands Ask Developers to Paste One Command. How to Spot the Fake, and What to Rotate If You Ran It.

If a recruiter, a conference invitation or a parcel-tracking page asks you to paste a command into your terminal to "verify" you are human, close the tab. No real hiring portal, conference registration or courier needs your shell. That single step is how the Trigram campaign gets developers to install an infostealer on themselves, and if you already ran one of those commands, treat the machine as compromised: rotate your keys, move your crypto, and kill your browser sessions from a clean device.
Stormshield's Cyber Threat Intelligence team published the research on Wednesday, November 11, 2026 (updated Monday, November 16). The Hacker News covered it today, November 17. Stormshield counts "approximately 50 brands" impersonated, mostly blockchain and AI companies, plus three parcel carriers (DHL, DPD and Aramex) and one AI and blockchain conference.
How to tell a real AI or crypto tool download, job page or invite from a fake one
The fake sites copy the real brand's look exactly. Stormshield's side-by-side screenshots show that, for example, Ritual, Webflow and Somnia were cloned pixel for pixel. Do not judge by the design. Judge by these instead.
The domain is not the company's domain. The pattern is the brand name glued to a recruiting word on a cheap top-level domain. Stormshield lists the schemes as brand plus council, hires, careers or talents, and the prefixes buildwith, join, workwith and inv2. Examples from their list: buildwithritual[.]xyz, joinwebflow[.]xyz, mantlehires[.]xyz, lineacareers[.]xyz, fuelcouncil[.]ink, inv2boyaa[.]site. Stormshield notes the domains are mostly registered at Namecheap on .xyz, .ink, .site, .space and .online. Get to a company's careers page by typing its real domain, or from its verified social accounts, never from the link in the email.
A referral or access code you did not ask for. Every Trigram scenario asks for a one-time code first. Stormshield found the codes are issued per target and locked to your IP address. A code that unlocks a "verification" step is the trap being armed for you.
Any instruction to open a terminal, PowerShell or Command Prompt and paste. This is the ClickFix technique. In Trigram it has a second trick: the first command you paste is harmless and only sends a nonce. The page then shows a fake error ("Operation timeout. Please try again. Nonce Refreshed.") and quietly swaps what the Copy button, and even a manual Ctrl+C, puts on your clipboard. The second paste ends with a newline, so it runs the moment you paste it, before you press Enter. The text on screen still looks like the first command.
A "deepfake protection," "device check" or "face verification" step. Stormshield found the operators' tracking console counts a "Face OK" step and a "Password" step. The payload calls itself deepfake_guard. Then, on macOS and Linux, it shows a fake system password prompt. SafeDep, which analyzed the same stealer, quotes the macOS dialog as titled "System Preferences" and reading "macOS needs your password to apply system updates and verify drivers and security settings." No browser page needs your system password.
A real project's build script that downloads something. Trigram is not only email. SafeDep reported that on Saturday, October 31, 2026, an attacker force-pushed a forged commit to the antd-img-crop GitHub repository that added a prebuild script running on "npm run build." SafeDep says "The npm package is not affected": the risk was to people who cloned and built the repository. Stormshield ties that commit's download server, icagllmbt[.]space, to the same infrastructure as the fake conference site.
If you already ran one: what to do, in this order
Do these from a different, clean device, not the one that ran the command.
- Move crypto first. Create a new wallet with a new seed phrase on a clean device and transfer funds out. Do not reuse any seed that was ever typed into, or stored on, the affected machine. SafeDep lists browser wallet extensions (MetaMask, Phantom, Rabby "and dozens more"), "about 34 desktop wallets per operating system" (including Exodus, Electrum, Ledger Live and Trezor Suite) and command-line key stores for Solana, Sui, NEAR and Foundry as targets.
- Sign out every browser session and change passwords. The stealer takes browser passwords and cookies from Chromium browsers and Firefox, and the macOS Keychain and Linux keyring. Stolen cookies let an attacker skip your password and your MFA, so changing the password is not enough: use "sign out of all sessions" on GitHub, GitLab, Google, Microsoft, cloud consoles, exchanges and anything else you were logged in to.
- Rotate developer secrets. SafeDep lists .env, .npmrc, .gitconfig, SSH keys and .kdbx (KeePass) files. That means cloud access keys, API tokens in any .env, npm and PyPI publish tokens, GitHub personal access tokens, SSH keys (remove the old public key from every server and Git host), and the KeePass master password plus everything inside it.
- Change your system password. If you typed it into a "System Preferences" or "Authentication Required" prompt, the attacker has it and used it to install with admin rights.
- Look for persistence, then rebuild. SafeDep names these: a LaunchDaemon com.google.UpdateSupporter on macOS, google-agent.service on Linux, a scheduled task GoogleUpdateSupporterNode on Windows, and a VS Code or Cursor extension google-dev-tools.google-update-support. Stormshield's detection rule also lists /var/tmp/.kdm., /var/tmp/upd_m, a deepfake_guard_run.sh script, and a portable Node.js node-v20.18.1 folder that the loader downloads. Finding any of these means reinstall the operating system. Removing them by hand does not undo what was already stolen.
- Tell your employer's security team if the machine has any work access. A developer laptop that held a cloud key or a publish token is a supply chain problem, not only a personal one.
What is confirmed
All of the following is Stormshield's reporting unless another source is named.
- The lure. An email offers a fully remote software development job with a high salary and a referral code. The site collects your name, email, LinkedIn or portfolio and a personal statement, then sends you to an /anti-spam page that asks for the code and then for the terminal command.
- Three scenarios, one operator. Recruitment for Web3, AI and tech companies; an invitation to the International Conference on Advances in Generative AI, Large Language Models and Blockchain Technology (ICAGLLMBT), whose fake site even asks you to forward a ticket to a colleague; and DHL, DPD and Aramex parcel tracking. Stormshield says all three were hosted on 193.160.32[.]10, used the same verify_w and verify_m scripts, and generated the command after a code was entered, and estimates "with a high confidence that those three scenarios originate from the same operator."
- The loader. On Windows the pasted command downloads verify_w and saves it as v.cmd. On Linux and macOS it downloads verify_m. The loader installs Node.js v20.18.1 if needed, then downloads install_guard.js, which deploys the infostealer. Stormshield says the stealer collects "browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets and sensitive files" and deploys agents to keep access. SafeDep's report calls the stealer OverLord.
- The command server moves. The payload does not contain its C2 address. It reads it from a file on a public GitLab repository. SafeDep saw gitlab[.]com/drop-indexings/tasks pointing at api.chestsoi[.]ink on October 31. Stormshield saw gitlab[.]com/up-indexings/tasks, created November 3 at 03:05 UTC, pointing at api.cerysoi[.]ink on November 4.
- The back office. Stormshield found a Django application called rms-platform on 170.205.30[.]27 port 8000 with debug mode left on. Its leaked route list describes scraping target lists from GitHub, bulk email through Resend, Brevo, Mailgun and Smartlead, open tracking, per-target codes, and a wallet module touching five blockchain explorers. Stormshield rates the wallet module's purpose "Low to Moderate" confidence. The console scores each target "important," "moderate," or "useless."
- Attribution. Stormshield writes: "we assess with high confidence that Trigram represents a continuation of the UNK_DeadDrop cluster," the name Proofpoint has used since April 2026, and reports "strong similarities with intrusion sets documented as linked to North Korea." Stormshield also links the activity to research on Kimsuky by Genians. Two of the back-office hosts were already public: asteara[.]org in Proofpoint's April 2026 reporting, and 170.205.29[.]83 in both Proofpoint's and Genians' reporting.
What is not known
- How many people ran the command. Neither Stormshield nor The Hacker News gives a victim count. The console tracks installs against "real visitors," but Stormshield publishes no figure.
- The full brand list. Stormshield says about 50 brands and names some. The rest we infer from the domain names in its table, which is an inference, not their statement.
- What the stealer does after it lands. Stormshield says the infostealer and its agents "will be detailed in a follow-up article." The steal list above is SafeDep's, from the antd-img-crop chain.
- Whether the wallet module moves money. Stormshield rates that low to moderate confidence.
- Who is behind it, by name. Stormshield's attribution is to an activity cluster, with similarities to DPRK-linked sets. SafeDep, quoted by The Hacker News, says its own match "rests on technique and does not prove who the operators are."
- What the "cn" in the cn_ip_restricted cookie means. Stormshield says it may refer to China, "but this interpretation remains unconfirmed."
How we know
We read Stormshield's report directly and parsed its indicator table, which has 211 rows (two domains appear twice, so 209 unique values). We read SafeDep's antd-img-crop report for the steal list, the fake password prompt and the persistence names. We used The Hacker News article only to find the primary sources.
We checked a sample of the indicators against our own corpus before ingesting. Several were already present from public community feeds, not from our own sensors: the C2 gamsterb[.]ink, the back-office IP 170.205.29[.]83 and the Linux dropper hash arrived today, November 17, through TweetFeed tagged Kimsuky, and icagllmbt[.]space arrived on November 9 through ThreatFox, labeled Overlord RAT. That is corroboration of Stormshield's list by other researchers. It is not a detection of ours, and we make no claim to have seen any of this first.
This is a lure that victims pull down from the attacker's own sites. It is not an attack on servers like ours, so our edge sensors are not the instrument that would see it, and we did not run an edge check for it.
What is now in our feed
We ingested 213 indicators under the source manual-batch-trigram-2026-11, attributed to UNK_DeadDrop with malware family OverLord, at confidence 85 for Stormshield's table entries and 80 for six hosts named only in Stormshield's text. Stormshield rated every table entry High.
- 181 lure and decoy domains: 179 from Stormshield's table, plus somniabuilders[.]network and the fake job-offer sender domain dscufo[.]xyz from the text.
- 14 C2, distribution and back-office domains: gamsterb[.]ink, api.cerysoi[.]ink, api.fallgganata[.]ink, api.gaganata[.]ink, api.chestsoi[.]ink, asteara[.]org, dokamacto[.]xyz and its subdomains, and the console hosts on asteara, gaganata, cklomino and 3dscenebox.
- 12 IP addresses. These sit with Advin Services, Shock Hosting, Liga Hosting (IPXO), Internet Utilities (IPXO) and Fro LLC.
- 4 telemetry URLs (guard-launcher-result and guard-install-log on api.gamsterb[.]ink and api.fallgamsterb[.]ink).
- 2 SHA-256 hashes: cd20f43f985f7df7ba3ad9b08e5bdbecc20aaa4d8f60dc09e8468bdd1b249fe6 (Linux dropper) and 249626244f23928c75e6c382da62278ed1d4e012a0c0f62beafefc1e4d7c5baa (Windows dropper).
Two of Stormshield's 14 IPs we deliberately left out. 216.198.79[.]1 belongs to Vercel, Inc. per its ARIN registration, and is a shared front door for a very large number of unrelated sites. 198.54.127[.]82 sits in a Namecheap, Inc. hosting range. Blocking either at the IP would block legitimate sites along with the fakes. If you are loading Stormshield's table into a firewall yourself, block those two by domain, not by address. We also left out the GitLab relay URLs and the email and account names: those live on platforms you cannot block wholesale.
The domains are in our STIX feed at analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/stix-feed/domains.csv, the IPs in ips.csv and the hashes in hashes.csv at the same path. The feed needs an API key, and registration is free.
Sources
- Stormshield Customer Security Lab, "Trigram Campaign," published November 11, 2026, modified November 16, 2026: https://www.stormshield.com/news/cti-trigram-campaign/ (primary; indicator table and attribution)
- SafeDep, "antd-img-crop GitHub Repository Hijacked to Deliver OverLord Stealer," November 3, 2026: https://safedep.io/blog/antd-img-crop-forged-commit-overlord-stealer (steal list, password prompt, persistence)
- Proofpoint, "Don't Fear the Repo: UNK_DeadDrop Phishing Campaign Targets Developers to Steal Cryptocurrency": https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/dont-fear-repo-unkdeaddrop-phishing-campaign-targets-developers-steal (cited by Stormshield; we did not reread it for this post)
- Genians, "Kimsuky Integrates AI into Attack Operations," August 10, 2026: https://www.genians.co.kr/en/blog/threat_intelligence/kimsuky_ai_llm (cited by Stormshield; not reread)
- The Hacker News, "Trigram Campaign Impersonates About 50 AI and Blockchain Brands to Target Devs with Infostealers," November 17, 2026: https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/trigram-campaign-impersonates-about-50.html
- ARIN RDAP registration records for the 14 IPs, queried November 17, 2026.
Every indicator in this post is in the feed. Free.
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