Shonan Beauty Clinic's Owner Says Passwords Were Taken With 1.62 Million Records. Change It Wherever You Reused It, and Expect Phishing That Knows Your Treatment

What to do first. If you have ever made an account, booked, filled in a form or answered a survey on a Shonan Beauty Clinic (SBC湘南美容クリニック) website, assume your password is in someone else's hands. Change it anywhere else you used the same one, starting with email, then banking and shopping. Then treat any message that mentions your treatment, your booking or a "refund" from SBC as suspect until you have reached the clinic yourself, through a number you looked up. If you work at one of the clinics SBC manages, change your work password and any personal account where you reused it: employee IDs and passwords were taken too.
What SBC Medical confirmed
SBC Medical Group Holdings (Nasdaq: SBC) filed an 8-K under Item 8.01 dated November 18, 2026, with a press release as Exhibit 99.1. It describes two separate incidents in its Japan business, both on November 16.
Incident 1: SBC's own website database. The release says "unauthorized access occurred to certain databases within a website system managed and operated by SBC Medical Group, Ltd.", its Japanese subsidiary. Its security monitoring flagged anomalous activity on November 16, and it reported the incident to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission the same day. The release does not name the website. The Shonan Beauty Clinic site (s-b-c.net) carries a banner titled "Important notice: apology and notice regarding personal information leakage due to unauthorized access", linking to SBC's Japanese notice.
What the release says was taken, per category (the release does not say how much the categories overlap, so do not add them up):
- Basic personal information for 1,624,000 people, records dating from 2010 to 2023: all or some of name, sex, phone, email, password, address, date of birth, patient card number, member ID and survey answers. The release says this set did not include reservation or treatment information.
- 255,416 reservation requests made through advertising, affiliate and campaign pages (2007 to 2026).
- 217,769 website inquiries (2004 to 2026), including what people typed into the form. A footnote says 14 of those entries contained credit card details, all for cards that could no longer be charged, such as expired ones.
- 4,513 treatment-monitor records (2013 to 2026): treatment descriptions and the file names of stored images. The release says the images themselves were not included.
- 15,007 reviews sent directly to the group (2015 to 2018), with treatment names and review text.
- About 20,000 employee account records, with names, IDs and passwords, covering the group and the clinics it supports. For 459 employees, bank account, pension and tax paperwork was also taken.
Incident 2: Tribeau, a third-party booking platform. The same day, the operator of Tribeau told SBC about unauthorized access to clinic administrator accounts. 56 clinics that SBC manages use it. Exposed: reservation details for 12,641 people (name in kana, phone, age, requested treatment, notes), and for 6,804 of them the treatment received, its date and its fee. Three people who messaged a clinic also had the messages, date of birth and sex exposed. SBC says Tribeau held no email addresses, home addresses, cards, passwords or medical records for these people. All administrator passwords for SBC-managed clinics on Tribeau were invalidated, and traffic from the attacking sources was blocked.
What is not known
- How the passwords were stored. The release says only "Customer passwords were also obtained." It does not say hashed, salted or plaintext. Until SBC says otherwise, plan as if they can be read.
- How the attacker got in. "The method of intrusion and full scope remain under investigation."
- Who did it. No group is named and no ransom or extortion is mentioned in the 8-K or in BleepingComputer's report. We found no leak-site claim in the sources we read, and we do not visit leak sites.
- Medical records. SBC says that as of November 18 it had not confirmed theft of electronic medical records or of data in its mySBC reservation site, and had seen no misuse of the stolen data.
- What SBC tells customers to do. SBC's Japanese notice (sbc-holdings.com/ja/news/605) returned HTTP 403 to our fetch, so we could not read its customer instructions. The 8-K mentions planned costs for "customer notification, call center operations", so expect letters and a hotline.
Why this one is worse than the raw count
A beauty clinic database is not like a shoe store's. Survey answers, reservation pages for named campaigns, inquiry text and treatment names tell a stranger what someone was thinking about having done. That makes for very convincing phishing ("your appointment for X needs confirming") and, at the ugly end, embarrassment-based extortion. If a message threatens to reveal your treatment unless you pay, do not pay and do not reply. Report it to the police and to the clinic.
Two details are worth noting for any company. The basic-information set runs back to 2010, and the inquiry set to 2004: records kept for 15 to 20 years were exposed by an incident in 2026. And the second incident came through a booking platform the company does not run, the same shape as Uber's driver data leaking through Fireworks AI this month. Data you no longer need, and data you handed to a vendor, can still be stolen.
Am I affected? A self-check
- Search your inbox for mail from s-b-c.net or SBC Medical Group, in any year since 2004. If you find booking confirmations, inquiry replies or member registration emails, you are probably in at least one of the sets above.
- Check whether that email address shows up in your password manager with a password you also use elsewhere. Change those first.
- Clinic staff: if your work login ever matched a personal password, change the personal one now.
- Turn on two-step sign-in for your email account. A stolen password is far less useful against an account that also asks for a code.
Indicators
None published in the sources we read. The 8-K and BleepingComputer give no attacker IP addresses, domains or hashes, so we added nothing to the feed. Our "Am I affected?" site checker does not apply here: this was a server-side database breach, not a script loaded on a homepage.
Sources
- SBC Medical Group Holdings, Form 8-K, Item 8.01, dated November 18, 2026, and Exhibit 99.1, "SBC Medical Group Reports Cybersecurity Incidents in Japan": https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001930313/000149315226053135/form8-k.htm and https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001930313/000149315226053135/ex99-1.htm
- BleepingComputer, "Hackers steal data of 1.6 million SBC Medical Group customers" (November 19, 2026): https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-steal-data-of-16-million-sbc-medical-group-customers/
- SBC湘南美容クリニック homepage banner linking to the Japanese notice: https://www.s-b-c.net/ (the notice itself, https://sbc-holdings.com/ja/news/605, returned HTTP 403 to us).
Read next: Uber says its driver data breach came through Fireworks AI, a third downstream victim.
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