EggStreme Came Back Rebuilt Weeks After It Was Exposed. The New Agent Never Calls Home, It Waits on Port 5060. All 92 of Bitdefender's Indicators Are in Our Feed

What to do first. If you defend a government agency or a contractor in the Philippines or the region around it, do three things today. Block the 12 IP addresses and 43 domains Bitdefender published (they are in our feed now; register free to pull them). Search every Windows machine for a firewall rule named "Core Networking - SIP" and for anything listening on TCP port 5060 that is not a phone system. And look for a Run key value named "StandaloneUpdater" pointing into %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\OneDrive\setup\logs\. The new EggStreme agent can sit silent behind that firewall rule, so blocking its outbound traffic is not enough: you have to find it on the host.
What Bitdefender found
Bitdefender first exposed EggStreme on September 17, 2025, a fileless espionage framework used against a Philippine military company. On November 18, 2026, its researcher Bogdan Zavadovschi published "EggStreme Malware: Rebuilt Under Scrutiny", showing what the operators did next. In Bitdefender's words, the agent "uses a different network protocol, has an enhanced command set, and comes in a passive variant that never beacons out."
The changes, all from Bitdefender's report:
- A passive agent. Two builds (compiled September 2 and November 5, 2025) open a listener on TCP 5060, the port normally used for internet phone calls (SIP), and wait for the operator to connect. With nothing going out, a network sensor watching for beacons sees nothing. To let the connection in, the agent adds an inbound Windows Firewall rule named "Core Networking - SIP", on all three profiles, with edge traversal enabled. Real Windows has rules called "Core Networking", but not that one.
- New transport. The earlier gRPC channel is gone, replaced by raw TCP with mutual TLS (wolfSSL) and an inner AES-256 layer.
- More commands. Active Directory user, group and server enumeration; TCP port forwarding; WMI with supplied credentials; token impersonation; running .NET assemblies and PowerShell inside the agent's own process, without starting powershell.exe; and loading new programs straight into memory.
- No more keylogger. It is absent from every newer agent build, which Bitdefender reads as the operators choosing capabilities per build.
- Fast reaction. The configuration loader changed 12 days after the first report and the loader 14 days after that. Bitdefender calls it a rebuild, not a rotation of the same tools.
Who it targets, and who is behind it
Bitdefender says "with high confidence" the operation still targets Philippine government organizations, with multiple victims, none named. A Taiwan link is rated low to medium confidence and called "a lead, not an established fact". Bitdefender keeps its earlier wording, "a suspected Chinese APT group", and makes no new attribution. The Hacker News links parts of the toolset to the cluster Palo Alto Networks tracks as CL-STA-1048, but Bitdefender's report does not, and its researcher told THN he had not compared infrastructure or victims with that cluster. We do not attribute it further.
How the attackers get in is not known. Bitdefender saw them move once inside, using valid domain credentials and an unmanaged staging machine that served scripts to workstations over SMB file shares.
Am I affected? What to hunt for
These come from Bitdefender's report and its published indicator file. They work even when the hashes have changed.
- Firewall: a rule named "Core Networking - SIP", or any inbound rule added by a program rather than by policy. On a PC with no phone software, anything listening on TCP 5060 is suspect. Run netstat -ano and look for :5060 in LISTENING state.
- Run key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, value StandaloneUpdater, pointing to StandaloneUpdater.exe under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\OneDrive\setup\logs\. The real OneDrive updater is called OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe and does not live there.
- Scripts: WScript.exe or cmd.exe running files from C:\Users\Public\, especially prncnfg.vbs or Officelog.bat.
- Sideloaded DLLs: a Windows system library name (advapi32.dll, dbghelp.dll, dwmapi.dll, iscsiexe.dll, DevicesPlatform.dll, xwizards.dll) loaded from outside C:\Windows\System32.
- Payload files in odd places: Alarm00.wav in C:\Windows\Media, systemZones.res in C:\Windows\Globalization\ICU, appmain.sdb or expmain.sdb in C:\Windows\apppatch, msinfo32.dll under Common Files\Microsoft Shared\msinfo, Feeds.tmp under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Feeds, CDPGlobalSettings.cdpresource under %LOCALAPPDATA%\ConnectedDevicesPlatform.
- Configuration files: Unistore.db under %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Comms, Crypto.db under the system profile's Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto folder, and any process other than Windows itself touching wpndatabase.dat.
- PowerShell in the wrong process: clr.dll or System.Management.Automation loaded into a process that is not a .NET or PowerShell program. Turn on PowerShell script block logging if it is off.
- Network: a client presenting a TLS certificate to a rare domain, and hosts on TCP 8443 to 8445 serving certificates that have nothing to do with the host. Bitdefender also lists five certificate key identifiers for the operators' private certificate authorities.
If you find one, capture memory before cleaning the machine: Bitdefender notes the key that decrypts one component's traffic exists only in memory. Bitdefender offers the passive agent's handshake key to vetted defenders on request.
Indicators, and what we did with them
Block these: register free for the DugganUSA feed (docs at docs.dugganusa.com).
Bitdefender published 98 indicators in its malware-ioc repository on GitHub. We added the 92 that a blocklist can use, as source manual-batch-eggstreme-2026-11, at confidence 85, credited to Bitdefender: 12 IP addresses, 43 domains and 37 MD5 file hashes. The 5 certificate key identifiers and 3 path-only entries are listed in the report and above, not in the feed. This is Bitdefender's research; we redistribute it, we did not find it.
IP addresses (defanged): 45[.]115[.]225[.]73, 109[.]248[.]24[.]84, 149[.]104[.]109[.]230 (configuration-loader C2); 141[.]98[.]215[.]76, 141[.]98[.]215[.]91, 49[.]157[.]46[.]200, 49[.]157[.]47[.]158, 103[.]18[.]229[.]206, 165[.]154[.]58[.]112, 154[.]90[.]32[.]171 (agent C2); 221[.]128[.]249[.]228, 45[.]221[.]112[.]129 (development machines).
Domains (defanged): mepintei[.]com, hostkbc[.]com, ageniu[.]org, salariedemployment[.]com, rodosdeals[.]com, eusurvey[.]org, fsstore[.]org, bigitx[.]com, laichingte[.]net, rishra[.]net, osaweb[.]org, precontact[.]org, siliconmetal[.]net, dalkeys[.]com, readyui[.]net, fetraa[.]com, konledge[.]com, kiakzo[.]com, whosecity[.]org, flowtide[.]org, naeal[.]org, addadhd[.]net, sealtribute[.]org, gbbmv[.]org, logidash[.]net, greenat[.]org, ronaldmooremd[.]net, vepress[.]org, dservicos[.]com, saluxestore[.]com, oknostr[.]com, kypirc[.]org, sgko[.]net, eworkify[.]com, kazinovavada[.]com, ecomvisu[.]com, brushux[.]com, webpirat[.]net, safiasol[.]com, owark[.]org, renoveair[.]com, padau[.]org, zonaimpo[.]com.
The 37 MD5 hashes (11 loaders, 8 payloads, 4 configuration loaders, 6 agent builds including the 2 passive ones, 8 agent configurations) are in the feed and in Bitdefender's CSV. Hashes will change; the hunting list above will not, which is why Bitdefender recommends building detections on behavior.
What our own sensors saw. We checked all 12 IP addresses against our edge blocks (567,844 since October 21), our edge trap hits (96,594) and our origin honeypot (688). None of the 12 appears in any of them. That is expected and says little: these are command servers that operators connect from or that implants talk to, not scanners that sweep the internet, and our sensors guard our own sites, not Philippine government networks. We have no detection lead here and claim none.
Sources
- Bitdefender, "EggStreme Malware: Rebuilt Under Scrutiny", Bogdan Zavadovschi, November 18, 2026: https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/eggstreme-malware-revises-architecture-infrastructure
- Bitdefender indicator file: https://github.com/bitdefender/malware-ioc/blob/master/2026_11-eggstreme-iocs.csv
- The Hacker News, "New EggStreme Malware Variant Goes Silent to Evade Security Tools in Government Attacks", November 18, 2026: https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/eggstreme-hackers-rebuild-malware-with.html
Read next: Check Point says one toolmaker, CopperDragon, arms three China-nexus spy campaigns
Block these: register free for the DugganUSA feed and pull the 92 EggStreme indicators with everything else we publish.
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